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Abstract This article examines whether natural disasters affect fertility—a topic
little explored but of policy importance given relevance to policies regarding
disaster insurance, foreign aid, and the environment. The identification strategy
uses historic regional data to exploit natural variation within each of two coun-
tries: one European country—Italy (1820–1962), and one Asian country—Japan
(1671–1965). The choice of study settings allows consideration of Jones’ (The
European miracle, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1981) theory that
preindustrial differences in income and population between Asia and Europe
resulted from the fertility response to different environmental risk profiles.
According to the results, short-run instability, particularly that arising from the
natural environment, appears to be associated with a decrease in fertility—thereby
suggesting that environmental shocks and economic volatility are associated with
a decrease in investment in the population size of future generations. The results
also show that, contrary to Jones’ (The European miracle, Cambridge University
Press, Cambridge, 1981) theory, differences in fertility between Italy and Japan
cannot be explained away by disaster proneness alone. Research on the effects of
natural disasters may enable social scientists and environmentalists alike to better
predict the potential effects of the increase in natural disasters that may result
from global climate change.
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Introduction
Dynamic demographic–economic relationships have been of interest to social
scientists ever since Malthus proposed an economic theory of population growth in
the late eighteenth century (see e.g., NBER 1960; Schofield and Wrigley 1985;
Lindahl-Kiessling and Landberg 1994; Galor 2004). However, while it may describe
long-run relationships between population and income in preindustrial Western
societies, the classical Malthusian theory fares less well in more general contexts.
One possible reason is that, in focusing primarily on the extent to which wages and
vital rates exert influence on each other in steady state over the long run of several
generations, the classical theory has overlooked the possible effects of environ-
mental shocks and other forms of short-run instability on the demographic–
economic system that occur within a single generation.
Individuals behave differently under conditions of instability, risk, and uncer-
tainty than they do under conditions of perfect certitude. For example, ample
empirical evidence suggests that household-level income volatility leads to lower
investment in both physical and human capital at the micro level, and that country-
level economic volatility leads to lower government spending and lower mean
growth at the macro level (Blattman et al. 2007, and references therein). In a similar
fashion, sources of instability are likely to affect fertility decisions as well.
According to Cain (1983): ‘‘If people are motivated by a principle of safety-first,
[their fertility behavior] may be influenced less by average mortality experience
than by variance in that experience, and particularly the tail of the distribution that
contains the worst records’’ (p. 698). Just as individuals in unstable economic
environments may be less willing to invest in capital, individuals in volatile natural
environments may be less willing to invest in bearing children.1
The purpose of this article is to expand upon the existing literature on population
and the economy by examining whether natural disasters affect fertility. The
identification strategy uses regional data to exploit the natural variation within each
of two countries: one European country—Italy, and one Asian country—Japan. The
time periods under consideration are 1820–1962 for Italy and 1671–1965 for Japan.
An analysis of the effects of environmental shocks on fertility is important for
two reasons. First, because there are considerable differences in the stability of the
natural environment across the world, studies of the effects of environmental
shocks on demographic–economic relationships may enable economists to better
understand the sources of cross-country differences in population growth and
income.
There is an extensive literature that theoretically and conceptually discusses the
consequences of population growth on a country’s economy (see e.g., Lee and
Edwards 2001; Coale and Hoover 1969; Spengler 1969; Stavig 1979, and references
therein). In his empirical study of 94 countries over the period 1955–1971, Stavig
(1979) finds that rapid population increase had a negative impact on changes in
many crucial economic indicators—including change in per capita gross capital
1 In this article, the phrase ‘‘investing in children’’ is used to capture the bearing of new children rather
than investments in the health and education of existing children.
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formation, government consumption, manufacturing, and exports—many of which
are highly correlated to change in per capita GNP.
If population size affects the living standard, then an understanding of all the
factors influencing population growth, including environmental ones, is essential for
understanding global income inequality and past, current, and future economic
development. For instance, Jones (1981) makes the bold claim that differences in
Asian and European population growth and income prior to the Industrial
Revolution were due to the fertility response to different risk profiles; Asia’s
natural disaster-prone environment was to blame for its lower income.
A second reason why research on environmental shocks is important is that it has
implications for policies regarding disaster insurance, foreign aid, and the
environment. For example, if natural disasters cause a decrease in fertility because
they make families reluctant to invest in having children, then risk-sharing policies
such as disaster insurance can help mitigate these effects. Similarly, if economic
volatility is associated with a decline in fertility, then foreign aid policies that
minimize the volatility can attenuate the impact on fertility.
In addition to the relationship between environmental shocks and fertility, this
article also examines the relationship between economic volatility and fertility.
Economic volatility is included as well because it is another form of short-run
instability that may affect fertility, and because economic volatility has been found
in other studies to lower investment in physical and human capital (Blattman et al.
2007, and references therein). This article examines whether economic volatility,
like environmental instability, may be associated with changes in fertility.
Italy and Japan were chosen for the empirical analysis based on the following
factors: the availability of region-level data, the prevalence of natural disasters,
and the need for a country each from Europe and Asia. The choice of two natural
disaster-prone countries, one from Europe and one from Asia, enables one to
build upon Jones’ (1981) theory that differences in fertility behavior in Asia and
Europe were a result of differences in the prevalence of natural disasters—not
differences in culture, society, history, or politics—and, therefore, that any other
society subjected to the volatility of the Asian environment would have responded
in a similar manner. This article is a first cut at comparing causes of historical
fertility in Asia and Europe; a more thorough analysis will be the subject of
future study.
According to the results, natural disasters have a significant association with
fertility in both countries. In Italy, earthquakes had a robust negative association
with fertility, particularly marital fertility. In Japan, tsunamis had a robust negative
association with fertility while earthquakes had a significant positive association
with fertility in some specifications. Short-run economic volatility has a significant
negative association with fertility in Italy, but no association in Japan.
The remainder of this article is as follows. Section ‘‘Previous literature’’ surveys
the relevant literature. Section ‘‘Determinants of fertility’’ describes the mecha-
nisms through which income, mortality, and instability may affect fertility. The data
are described in Section ‘‘Data’’, and the estimation methodology is described in
Section ‘‘Econometric methodology’’. Results are presented in Section ‘‘Results’’.
Section ‘‘Concluding remarks’’ concludes.
Popul Environ (2010) 31:255–281 257
123
Previous literature
Environment, demography, and economic growth
This article relates to several existing branches of literature. First, it draws upon the
literature on the effects of the environment on economic development (see e.g.,
Diamond 1997; Gallup et al. 1999; Sachs 2001; Boserup 1996; Pebley 1998), and
the literature on the link between economic growth and population growth (Bloom
and Sachs 1998; Bloom and Williamson 1998; Bloom et al. 2003).
This article relates most closely to the study of Portner (2006), who uses data on
hurricanes in Guatemala over the last 120 years combined with a recent household
survey to analyze how decisions on education and fertility respond to hurricane risk
and shocks. By measuring risks and shocks separately, Portner is able to separate
out the impact of shocks on fertility in the short-run from the impact of risk on
fertility in the long-run. Portner uses the average percent chance of being hit by a
hurricane in a year, as averaged over all the years in his data, as his measure of risk.
Risk is, therefore, a time-invariant variable. By using county fixed effects that
absorb the effect of all county-level time invariant variables, including risk, this
article similarly controls for risk to identify the short-run effect of an environmental
shock.
This article also relates to the study of Kalipeni (1996), whose analysis of the
demographic response to environmental pressure in Malawi finds that areas that are
experiencing intense environmental pressure are also beginning to go through a
fertility transition. In particular, Kalipeni finds evidence of declining fertility rates
in response to environmental pressure particularly in areas with high population
densities. This article similarly examines the association between the environment
and fertility.
Previous studies have shown that instability in the environment in the form of
famines and wars have a negative effect on fertility. In his analysis of South Asian
famines, Dyson (1991) finds a reduction in conceptions prior to a famine even
without a major rise in the death rate, perhaps due to conscious planning during the
periods of mounting adversity preceding a famine. Boyle and Grada (1986) find that
at the onset of the Great Irish Famine of 1845–1849, the fertility rate dropped to
75% of its pre-Famine level and remained at this level for the duration of the
famine. In their study of Angola et al. (2002) find evidence of a wartime drop in
fertility. In their study of Cambodia et al. (2007) find a one-third decline in fertility
during the Khmer Rouge regime, under which 25% of the Cambodian population
died.
Asia versus Europe
The choice to examine both an Asian country and a European country relates to
Jones’ (1981) theory that preindustrial differences in income and population
between Asia and Europe resulted from the fertility response to different
environmental risk profiles.
258 Popul Environ (2010) 31:255–281
123
According to Jones’ theory, because Asians were faced with a more natural
disaster-prone environment, they accumulated a population surplus as a form of
demographic insurance against catastrophe; they, therefore, had a higher fertility
rate, a higher marriage rate, and a lower age at marriage in steady state than their
European counterparts did. This strategy of family size maximization resulted in
lower consumption levels, lower savings rate, less investment in human capital, and
larger disparities in income in Asia than in Europe. Thus, according to Jones,
preindustrial differences in environmental risk had dire consequences on social and
economic inequality both within and between the two regions. Natural disasters
were to blame for Asia’s relative poverty. Moreover, Jones claims, demographic
choices were a result of the risk profile of the environment; if the risk profile were to
change, then the steady-state choices would change as well.
This article expands upon Jones’ study in two main ways. Jones uses measures of
the incidence and effects of a natural disaster that are potentially endogenous to
fertility. For example, one measure Jones uses is the death toll from a disaster,
which is endogenous because it depends in part on the population density, which is
in turn affected by fertility. In contrast, this article instead uses measures that are
exogenous: the number and geophysical magnitude of disasters, neither of which are
affected by fertility.
The second innovation in this article is that is focuses on the short-run behavioral
effects of a disaster rather than its long-run steady-state implications. While the
long-run steady state takes place over centuries and multiple generations, short-run
behavioral effects take place over decades, within a single generation. Jones’ theory
describes the steady-state relationships among population growth, economic
development, and environmental instability. While greater environmental instability
may lead to greater population growth in the long-run steady state, it is likely that
the effect might be the opposite during short-run transitions. In the immediate
aftermath of a disaster, one might expect risk-averse individuals to react by
decreasing, rather than increasing, long-term investments in assets such as children.
The latter short-run behavioral response is the focus of this article.
Volatility and investment
This article also innovates upon the burgeoning literature linking economic
volatility to lower investment. At the microeconomic level, empirical evidence
suggests that households respond to income volatility by diversifying and skewing
their income-generating activities toward low-risk alternatives with lower returns,
thereby decreasing their investment in physical and human capital (Blattman et al.
2007, and references therein). For example, Rosenzweig and Wolpin (1993) find
that risk-averse farmers faced with borrowing constraints and low and uncertain
incomes underinvest in assets needed for agricultural production and consumption
smoothing, thus leading to output losses, lower incomes, and greater income
volatility. Similarly, income volatility causes parents to underinvest in the health
and education of their children (Frankenberg et al. 1999; Thomas et al. 2004).
Empirical evidence suggests that economic instability decreases investment at
the macroeconomic level as well. For example, in their examination of 92
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developed and developing economies between 1962 and 1985, Ramey and Ramey
(1995) find that countries with high macroeconomic volatility have lower
government spending and lower mean growth. Countries that face borrowing
constraints and terms of trade shocks may have difficulty smoothing public
investment and expenditure (Blattman et al. 2007).
In some ways, giving birth to a child is a form of investment just as investing in
capital is. As noted by Becker (1960), children are a durable consumption and
production good. The motives for having children may include both the direct
satisfaction children are expected to provide their parents and the indirect
satisfaction they may render by working in the household or family business or
by remitting money income to their parents (Willis 1973). In traditional societies,
children are beneficial to parents from an early age as a source of labor; they
represent an investment for support in old age, an insurance against risk in a
hazardous environment, and enhance the physical security and political influence of
the family unit (Cleland and Wilson 1987). Childbirth requires huge up-front costs
in terms of time and money, and the potential insurance benefits of having children
accrue in the future. Economic uncertainty can, therefore, lead to lower levels of
fertility (Kohler et al. 2002; Perelli-Harris 2005). This article expands on the
literature connecting income volatility with lower capital investment and depressed
long-run economic performance by examining whether natural disasters and
economic volatility affects investment in the future population size.
Determinants of fertility
What factors determine fertility? The classical Malthusian theory posits that fertility
is affected by income and mortality; the hypothesis of this article is that short-run
shocks should have an effect as well. This section describes the mechanisms through
which each of these factors may affect fertility.
There are several possible theories for how fertility may respond to income.
Malthusian theory predicts that wages should have a positive effect on fertility
through its effect on increasing the marriage rate (Lee and Wang 1999), perhaps
because in Europe, couples could not marry before they acquired an economic
means of support (Lee 1973). Another possible reason for a positive relationship
between wages and fertility is that higher incomes lead to better nutrition, which in
turn enhances fecundity (Lee 1985). Moreover, because children are a consumer
durable, an increase in income should increase both the quality and quantity of
children (Becker 1960).
On the other hand, it is also possible for higher wages to have a negative effect on
fertility. One reason why fertility may decrease with income is that higher wages
diminish the need for children as a form of insurance. For instance, higher income
levels may be associated with the development of other forms of insurance (Cleland
and Wilson 1987). A second reason is that higher income levels may be associated
with a stronger social custom against marriage or a stronger social custom favoring
quality of children rather than quantity. Third, when one’s earnings in the labor
market are high, then the opportunity cost of marriage and of raising children are
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high as well (Mason 1997). Thus, because theory suggests that wages can have
either a positive or negative effect on fertility, it is possible that wages have no net
effect.
In addition to the wage, a second determinant of fertility that is included in the
Malthusian model is the crude death rate. The classical economic theory of
population growth predicts that fertility should increase with mortality. For
example, if couples desire to have a certain number of surviving children, then
higher rates of infant and child mortality would induce higher levels of marital
fertility, for parents would endeavor to replace the children they have lost. Likewise,
in some preindustrial populations, age at death of one’s father would affect the
timing of inheritance and, therefore, of one’s marriage (Lee 1973), so that a higher
death rate would lead to earlier marriage and, therefore, a higher birth rate as well.
On the other hand, as with other forms of risk, mortality risk may affect
individual behavior and, in particular, reduce long-term investing. To the extent that
the crude death rate is a measure of mortality risk, therefore, it is possible that
fertility decreases with mortality. For instance, if child death rates are high, then
children become a more risky investment, and parents may choose to invest less in
having them. Likewise, if adult death rates are high, then parents may be more
cautious about having a child if they do not believe they will live long enough to
care for the child, or long enough to reap any potential old age insurance benefits
from investing in children.
While the classical economic theory has focused primarily on income and
mortality, this article focuses instead on an additional determinant of fertility:
environmental shocks, as measured by the number and magnitude of natural
disasters. Income and mortality are used as controls. According to Jones (1981),
who hypothesized that families living in a more natural disaster-prone environment
would accumulate a population surplus as a form of demographic insurance against
catastrophe, one would expect natural disasters to have a positive effect on fertility.
However, it is also possible that short-run environmental shocks may decrease
fertility, perhaps because the shock makes individuals less willing to make the long-
term investments required to raise a family. Another reason individuals might have
lower fertility in the short run after an environmental shock is that the disaster
causes a disruption in family life and social organization, for example by causing
the death and/or break-up of families, by destroying houses, or by causing
individuals to lose their jobs. This article investigates the effects of short-run
environmental shocks, and, therefore, hypothesizes that environmental shocks are
associated with a decrease in fertility.
In addition to natural disasters, a second form of short-run instability considered in
this article is economic volatility, as measured by the variance of the detrended wage.
Economic theory predicts that greater economic volatility will lower investment in
human and physical capital (Blattman et al. 2007). In this article, it is hypothesized
that, like natural disasters, greater economic volatility will also lower the investment
in the future population size, and is, therefore, associated with lower fertility.
Social factors influence fertility as well. Societal norms about reproduction affect
fertility (Munshi and Myaux 2006; Thomson and Goldman 1987). Fertility
decisions often occur in specified social contexts. For example, a woman’s social
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network and social world may affect her fertility behavior (Madhavan et al. 2003).
Social influences would affect the short-run and long-run responses to shocks. These
social factors are addressed in several ways. First, analyzing Italy and Japan
separately allows for country-level social differences between the two countries.
Second, a region-level fixed effects model allows for region-level social factors.
Third, a spatial model allows for social spillovers between neighboring regions, and,
therefore, for social networks that may possibly spill over from one region to the
next.2
Data
Demographic, economic, and disaster data for Italy (1820–1962) and Japan (1671–
1965) are used. Data from many countries were initially gathered, but Italy and Japan
were chosen for the final analysis based on the following factors: the availability of
region-level data, the prevalence of natural disasters, and the need for a country each
from Europe and Asia.3 The choice of two natural disaster-prone countries, one from
Europe and one from Asia, enables one to build upon Jones’ (1981) theory that
differences in fertility behavior in Asia and Europe were a result of differences in the
prevalence of natural disasters—not differences in culture, society, history, or
politics—and, therefore, that any other society subjected to the volatility of the Asian
environment would have responded in a similar manner. The data sources used for
Italy and Japan are detailed in Appendixes 1 and 2, respectively.
Demographic data were compiled from various print sources or extracted from
the Princeton European Fertility Project online demographic data set (Treadway
1980). These variables include the following measures of fertility: crude birth rates,
the index of total fertility (If), the index of marital fertility (Ig), and the index of
non-marital fertility (Ih).4 They also include crude death rates. The print sources for
2 These models also address possible country-level or region-level biological influences as well.
3 Other countries and regions for which data were initially gathered include: Austria-Hungary, Belgium,
China, Denmark, England, France, Germany, India, Netherlands, Romania, Scandinavia, Serbia, Sweden,
Southeast Asia, Switzerland, and Taiwan, but these countries were not used because region-level panel
data for crude birth rates and crude death rates were too sparse, and/or natural disasters were too
infrequent.
4 If is defined as the ratio of the number of births the women in a given population actually have to the
number they would have had if they were subjected to a maximal well-recorded age-specific fertility
schedule (that of the Hutterites). Ig is defined as the ratio of the number of births the married women in a
given population actually have to the number they would have had if they were subjected to the maximal
age-specific fertility schedule. Ih is the ratio of the number of births the unmarried women in a given
population actually have to the number they would have had if they were subjected to the maximal age-
specific fertility schedule. The index of marital status (Im), which is not used in this article, is the ratio of
the number of births married women would experience if subjected to the maximal age-specific fertility
schedule to the number of births all women would experience if subjected to that same maximal fertility
schedule; it is an index of the extent to which the marital status distribution would contribute to the
attainment of maximal fertility in a population in which all births were to married women.
The fertility indices have the following relationship:
If  Im  Ig þ 1 Imð Þ  Ih
(Treadway 1980).
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Italy’s demographic data are Livi-Bacci (1977) and del Panta (1979). The print
sources for Japan’s demographic data are Hanley and Yamamura (1977); Morris and
Smith (1985); Smith (1977); Jannetta and Preston (1998).
Annual real wage data were from Jeffrey Williamson: the Italian wage index
(1900 = 100) was taken from Williamson (1995) while the Japanese wage index
(1934–1936 = 100) was provided in digital form. This wage data was used to
calculate, for each year, the variance of the detrended wage over the past 20 years
prior to and including that year in the base case.5 Whenever possible, the variables
for both the level and the variance of the wage were averaged over the same years
over which observations for the demographic dependent variable spanned in any
given regression.6 All averages were centered on the floor of the midpoint of the
years covered in the average.
Daily natural disaster data on the number and magnitudes of earthquakes,
tsunamis, and volcanos were taken from the National Geophysical Data Center web
site (Dunbar et al. 1999; Lockridge 1999; Whiteside 1999). In order to measure the
severity of the earthquake, either the Modified Mercalli Intensity Scale of 1931,
which takes on integer values from 1 (least intense) to 12 (most intense); or the
geophysical magnitude, where each increase in magnitude represents a 10 fold
increase surface wave amplitude,7 is used. The magnitude of a tsunami is defined as
the log of twice the maximum runup height of the wave; this value is incremented
by 2, so that the minimum value is 1 instead of –1.8 For the volcano magnitude, the
volcano explosivity index is incremented by 1, so that it takes on integer values
from 1 (tephra volume = 1E4, column height \0.1 km above crater) to 9 (tephra
volume C1E12, column height[25 km above sea level). For all types of disaster, a
magnitude or intensity of 0 denotes no disaster.
From the raw natural disaster data, variables are constructed for each year in the
data set for (1) the number of each type of disaster over the past 20 years prior to
and including that year, and for (2) the sum of the geophysical magnitudes of all
occurrences of earthquakes, tsunamis, and volcanos over the past 20 years prior to
and including that year. For example, for the 1880 observation, environmental
shocks are aggregated over 1861–1880. When multiple observations existed for any
given disaster, an average of the magnitudes reported was taken.
In the base case, both the measure of environmental shock and the measure of
short-run economic volatility consider events that have occurred over the previous
20 years. This is because individuals who are making choices about marriage,
5 The variance of the wage was then divided by 1000 so that the magnitude of its coefficients in the
various regressions would not be too small.
6 Some of the original wage data for preindustrial epochs has already been interpolated over several
years.
7 While some records report both the earthquake magnitude and the earthquake intensity, others report
only one. Whether the earthquake magnitude or the earthquake intensity is used in the regressions as the
measure of the severity of the earthquake depends on which variable has more observations for that
country. When an earthquake occurs but either the magnitude or the intensity is not reported, then this
value is coded as missing, not 0 (which denotes no disaster).
8 This enables 0 to denote no disaster.
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childbearing, and potential tradeoffs with their careers do so in their early twenties,9
and, therefore, have experienced the previous two decades of environmental
disasters and economic instability. As a robustness check, the previous 10 years is
also used to measure short-run instability.10
The demographic, economic, and natural disaster data are used to construct a
panel data set for Italy and a panel data set for Japan.
For the Italian panel, the unit of observation is a region. There are 18 regions in
Italy; following del Panta (1979), these regions can be grouped into five
geographical areas: Northwest, Northeast, Center, South, and Islands. The panel
covers all 18 regions and spans the years 1820–1962. While measures of fertility
were available at the region level, the measures of mortality compiled were at the
level of the geographical area.11 Thus, for each geographical area, the area’s values
for the crude death rates were used for all regions in the area. The same national
Italian wage data, which reflect mainly the wages in Northern Italy, were applied to
all regions. Volcano data were matched to the region in which the volcano was
located. All other natural disaster data were matched to the region based on the
location(s) named in the source, or, when the location name could not be located in
any region, on the latitudes and longitudes given. Disasters that occur in areas larger
than a region are assumed to strike all regions in that area; disasters that occur in
areas smaller than a region are assumed to affect the entire region.
In the panel data set for Italy, the fertility variables generally each span 3 years per
observation. For example, for the fertility indices, there are up to 11 observations of
each fertility index for each region: (1) 1862–1866, (2) 1870–1872, (3) 1880–1882,
(4) 1890–1892, (5) 1900–1902, (6) 1910–1912, (7) 1921–1926, (8) 1930–1932,
(9) 1935–1937, (10) 1950–1952, and (11) 1960–1962. Of the 18 regions, 14 regions
have observations during 1862–1866, and 16 regions have observations during
1870–1912; all the 18 regions have observations from 1921–1962. For the crude birth
rate data, there are several more observations over other 3-year intervals for some of
the regions, so the crude birth rate data extends back to 1820.
Because the fertility data spans mostly 3 years per observation, the natural
disaster variables, which represent the sum of either the number or intensity of
natural disasters over the last 10 or 20 years, are averaged over 3 years. Similarly,
9 For the data gathered for this article, the minimum mean age at marriage for females was 21.8 for Italy
and 22.9 for Japan. For men in Italy, the minimum mean age at marriage is 27.1 (Lin 2004). The data set
compiled does not include data on the mean age at marriage for men in Japan.
10 The measure of shocks used by Portner (2006) is the number of hurricanes between the year the
woman enters her fertility period, taken to be 15 years, and her 29th year (thus spanning a 14-year time
period) or the survey year, whatever is first. The reason for the 29-year cutoff is that the majority of
women have most of their children before they turn 30.
11 The few figures that were found for regional crude death rates covered only seven regions with only 2–
6 observations each (del Panta 1979, p. 226). Moreover, periods of major crises were excluded from these
data; such an exclusion would bias the results of this study. Another alternative would be to calculate
regional averages from the provincial crude death rates reported in Hoffman (1981). I chose not to do so
for this study because the provincial data covered fewer time intervals than the geographical data did (5
per province as opposed to 9 per geographical area).
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the real wage and the variance of the wage (which is the variance in the detrended
wage over the past 10 or 20 years, divided by 1000) are averaged over 3 years as
well. Because the wage data begin in 1871, and because at least 10 prior years of
wage data are needed to form the variance of the wage, the regressions that
include the variance of the wage span the years 1880–1962. Geographical area-
level crude death rates span 4–5 years per observation. All the variables spanning
multiple years are centered on the floor of the midpoint of the years covered in the
average. For example, for each region in Italy, a birth rate that spans the three
years 1880–1882 is coupled with the average of the natural disaster variable for
the three 20-year ranges 1861–1880, 1862–1881, and 1863–1882, and the
observation is centered on the floor of the midpoint of the years covered in the
average, which in this case is the year 1881, the midpoint of 1880–1882. See
Appendix 1.
The Japan panel consists of data from 13 mura (villages), one shi (city) and one
han (domain), and spans the years 1671–1965. For lack of a better term, the level at
which an observation applies—whether it be a village, city or domain—is called a
‘‘place.’’ Observations are available for different years for each place, and each unit
of observation covers from 1 to 41 years depending on the place. For example, for
the domain, Morioka, there are 15 1-year observations: one every 10 years from
1680 to 1790, and also the years 1803, 1828, and 1840. The observations for the
other places cover different years. Each of the places can be matched to one of the
11 regions in Japan. Regressions include either place or region fixed effects.
The same national Japanese wage data were applied to all places; the data
were constructed by Jeffrey Williamson from pre-1930 wage data for Kyoto and
Kamikawarabayashi (near Osaka) and post-1930 wage data for Tokyo. The wage
data span the years 1727–1938. Volcano data were matched to the prefecture in
which the volcano was located. All other natural disaster data were matched to
the prefecture based on the location(s) named in the source, or, when the
location name could not be located in any prefecture, on the latitudes and
longitudes given. Disasters that occur in areas larger than a prefecture are
assumed to strike all prefectures in that area; disasters that occur in areas smaller
than a prefecture are assumed to affect the entire prefecture. All the places are
assumed to be affected by the disasters matched to the prefecture(s) in which
they are located.
For the panel data set for Japan, crude birth rates span 1–41 years per
observation, with an average span of approximately 10 years. Consequently, the
natural disaster variables, which represent the sum of either the number or intensity
of natural disasters over the last 20 years, are averaged over 10 years. Similarly, the
real wage and the variance of the wage (which is the variance in the detrended wage
over the past 10 years, divided by 1000) are averaged over 10 years as well.
Because the wage data span the years 1727–1938, and because at least 10 prior
years of wage data are needed to construct the variance of the wage variable, the
regressions that include the variance of the wage span the years 1737–1935. Crude
death rates span the same number of years as the crude birth rate for each
observation. All variables spanning multiple years are centered on the floor of the
midpoint of the years covered in the average. See Appendix 2.
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According to the summary statistics in Table 1, the mean crude birth rate for the
Italian regions over 1820–1962 was 30.31 births per 1000 people, while the mean
crude birth rate for Japan over 1671–1965 was 28.79 births per 1000 people. On
average, in any given 20-year period, there were 4.98 earthquakes and 0.69 volcano
eruptions in the Italy regions over 1820–1962; further there were 0.65 earthquakes,
0.35 tsunamis, and 0.65 volcano eruptions in Japan over 1671–1965.
Table 1 Summary statistics
Variable # obs Mean SD Min Max
Italy, 1820–1962
Crude birth rate (per 1000) 212 30.31 8.03 10.26 43.5
Total fertility index If 184 0.31 0.09 0.105 0.444
Marital fertility index Ig 184 0.57 0.15 0.222 0.809
Non-marital fertility index Ih 184 0.03 0.02 0.004 0.124
# Earthquakes (over past 20 years) 212 4.98 5.33 0 22.67
Earthquake intensity (over past 20 years) 212 52.60 59.55 0 254
# Volcano eruptions (over past 20 years) 212 0.69 2.27 0 15
Volcano magnitude (over past 20 years) 212 1.98 6.32 0 42.33
# Earthquakes (over past 10 years) 212 2.79 3.21 0 14.33
Earthquake intensity (over past 10 years) 212 29.48 35.92 0 155
# Volcano eruptions (over past 10 years) 212 0.36 1.20 0 7.67
Volcano magnitude (over past 10 years) 212 1.02 3.39 0 23
Crude death rate (per 1000) 120 16.85 6.80 8.7 32.6
Real wage (1900 = 100) 120 155.86 51.19 78 233.33
Variance in real wage (over past 20 years)/1000 120 0.97 1.01 0.06 2.82
Variance in real wage (over past 10 years)/1000 120 0.60 1.10 0.01 3.19
Japan, 1671–1965
Crude birth rate (per 1000) 165 28.79 10.91 4 81.5
Crude death rate (per 1000) 165 24.87 7.72 7.3 57.2
# Earthquakes (over past 20 years) 165 0.65 0.83 0 5.6
Earthquake magnitude (over past 20 years) 165 1.64 4.48 0 33.83
# Tsunamis (over past 20 years) 165 0.35 0.78 0 4
Tsunami magnitude (over past 20 years) 165 1.34 3.26 0 14
# Volcano eruptions (over past 20 years) 165 0.65 1.63 0 9.5
Volcano magnitude (over past 20 years) 165 1.96 5.01 0 28.5
# Earthquakes (over past 10 years) 165 0.34 0.52 0 3.6
Earthquake magnitude (over past 10 years) 165 0.81 2.53 0 20.33
# Tsunamis (over past 10 years) 165 0.20 0.49 0 2.6
Tsunami magnitude (over past 10 years) 165 0.78 2.08 0 12.4
# Volcano eruptions (over past 10 years) 165 0.35 0.90 0 4.9
Volcano magnitude (over past 10 years) 165 0.35 0.90 0 4.9
Real wage (1934–1936 = 100) 146 50.83 7.86 32.5 89.62
Variance in real wage (over past 20 years)/1000 146 0.04 0.02 0.01 0.09
Variance in real wage (over past 10 years)/1000 146 0.03 0.02 0.003 0.08
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Econometric methodology
The identification strategy employed in this article uses regional data to exploit
natural within-country variation for both Italy and Japan. With panel data, region
fixed effects can be used to control for time-invariant, region-specific omitted
variables such as local culture or local attitudes toward risk or mortality, or local
economic factors; and the country-specific time trend (the coefficient on year) can
be used to control for national trends including country-level changes in social
attitudes, cultural values, network behavior, and/or people’s fertility preferences.
The fixed effects also control for the average long-run steady-state environmental
risk faced by a particular region, thus enabling one to identify the effects of a short-
run environmental shock. The fixed effects similarly control for steady-state
differences in the economic volatility of different regions (e.g., their local economic
risk profiles).
The primary innovation of this article is to include measures of short-run
instability in traditional regressions of fertility on income and mortality. The
number and magnitudes of natural disasters are used to measure environmental
shocks and the variance of the detrended wage is used to measure economic
volatility.12 The joint significance of the natural disaster variables as well as the
joint significance of the economic variables are tested.
All regressions are OLS. For the economic variables, it is, therefore, assumed that
neither the real wage nor the variance of the wage is likely to be endogenous to the
contemporaneous birth rate because babies are too young to have an effect on the
labor market.13 For environmental shocks, exogenous measures are used:
the number and geophysical magnitude of natural disasters, neither of which are
affected by fertility.
For the crude death rate, one potential omitted variable that may cause the crude
death rate to be endogenous to fertility is famine, which not only elevates mortality
but also depresses fertility (Lee 1985; Maharatna 1996). Controlling for natural
disasters addresses this problem, at least in part, as natural disasters are often a cause
of famine. Moreover, any endogeneity of mortality to fertility would operate
through the number of births, not the birth rate. Fortunately, there does not appear to
be any major documented famine either in Italy over the period 1820–1962 or in
Japan over the period 1671–1965.14 Thus, it is assumed that, as with the other
regressors, the crude death rate is exogenous as well.
In using historical data, one may worry that the data may be noisy measurements
of the true values. Classical measurement error biases the coefficients toward zero
(Wooldridge 2002), which means that the effects may be underestimated. Thus, the
12 Previous regressions also included the minimum and the maximum of the detrended wage over the
past 10 years. However, because these variables did not turn out to be significant and because they had
little effect on the coefficient estimates of the other variables, but merely served to depress the degrees of
freedom, I excluded them in the analysis presented here.
13 It is possible that the birth rate may affect wages through, for example, the wages of pediatricians, of
childcare professionals, or the labor supply of women, but I assume that these effects are not of first-order.
14 See e.g., the list of famines in Walford (1970).
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results provide lower bounds to the magnitudes of the effects of natural disasters and
economic volatility.
Because local economic data were not available for the time periods and regions
analyzed, the fixed effects model does not pick up local short-run economic shocks
unless they are correlated with national economic shocks. Therefore, in order to
control for local short-run economic shocks, regressions are also run using regional
fixed effects, year effects, and variables interacting the regional area dummies with
year dummies. The spatial span for the regional variables to be interacted with year
is at the level of a geographical area for Italy, since its natural disaster variables are
at the level of a region, and at the level of a region for Japan—since its natural
disaster variables are at the level of a place. For both countries, these regressions
cannot include the wage or the variance of the wage, which are at a national level, as
they only have one value each per year, because they include year effects. For Italy
only, these regressions cannot include the crude death rate, which is at the
geographical area level, because they include geographical area fixed effects.
Because they include variables interacting regional area and year, these regressions
control for all the factors other than natural disasters (and mortality for Japan) that
vary by locality and time, including local economic shocks (and mortality for Italy).
In order to account for possible spatial spillovers, for example, due to social
influences that may spill over across regional borders, a spatial lag model is run for
Italy,15 where the crude birth rate z is given by
z ¼ qWz þ Xb1 þ WXb2 þ e; ð1Þ
where W is a weight matrix, X is a matrix of explanatory variables including natural
disasters, and e is i.i.d. normal. The weight matrix W assigns a ‘‘1’’ to all contiguous
neighboring regions and a ‘‘0’’ to all other regions. Because they have no neighbors,
the regions of Sardegna and Sicilia are dropped from the spatial analysis. The
parameter q indicates the extent of spatial interaction between neighboring
observations.
Results
What are the effects of instability on the crude birth rate in Italy? According to the
base case results (model 1) in Table 2, the number of earthquakes and the variance
in the detrended wage both have significant negative associations with the birth rate.
For example, one additional earthquake in the previous 20 years decreases the crude
birth rate by 24 births per 100,000 people. Relative to the mean crude birth rate for
Italy over this time period (1880–1962) of 26.46 per 1000, this is a 0.91% decrease.
Volcano eruptions do not have a significant effect on fertility. However, all the
disaster variables are jointly significant, as are the economic variables.
When the magnitudes of the disasters are used instead of the number (model 2),
the earthquake intensity and the variance in the wage both have significant negative
15 A spatial lag model could not be run for Japan because the villages, city, and domain chosen do not
neighbor each other (they do not share common borders with each other).
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coefficients. Once again, the disaster variables are jointly significant, and the
economic variables are jointly significant. Earthquakes, earthquake intensity, and
economic volatility continue to have a significant negative association with the
crude birth rate even when the number of previous years of either disasters or
economic volatility, or both, is changed from 20 to 10.16
The results for the crude birth rate in Italy show that short-run instability does
affect fertility behavior. However, the effect is the opposite of the one that would
occur as predicted by Jones (1981) as a result of long-run steady-state instability.
According to Jones (1981), who hypothesized that families living in a more natural
disaster-prone environment would accumulate a population surplus as a form of
demographic insurance against catastrophe, one would expect natural disasters to
have a positive effect on fertility. Instead, the results suggest that individuals react
to natural disasters by decreasing, not increasing, their fertility, perhaps because the
shock makes individuals less willing to make the long-term investments required to
raise a family. The direction of the result is thus consistent with the hypothesis that
individuals respond to short-run instability by decreasing such long-term invest-
ments as bearing and raising children.
In addition to natural disasters, a second form of short-run instability considered
is economic volatility, as measured by the variance of the detrended wage. Although
economic theory predicts that greater economic volatility will lower investment in
human and physical capital (Blattman et al. 2007), it is agnostic about its effects on
fertility. The empirical results of this article suggest that, just as with environmental
instability, individuals react to volatile wages by decreasing their fertility. The
direction of the result is also consistent with the hypothesis that individuals respond
to short-run instability by decreasing such long-term investments as bearing and
raising children.
Are the results for the crude birth rate robust to other measures of fertility in
Italy? As seen in Table 3, which presents the results from the base case using 20
previous years for both environmental shocks and economic volatility, the
significant negative coefficients in the base case models 1 and 2 of Table 2 on
either earthquake number or earthquake intensity and on the variance in the wage, as
well the joint significance of the disaster and economic variables, respectively, also
hold for both total fertility and marital fertility as well. Non-marital fertility is
affected only by the number of earthquakes, and not by the earthquake intensity or
economic volatility.
Table 4 reports the results when geographical area–year interactions are included
to control for all other factors other than natural disasters that vary by locality and
time, including local economic shocks and local mortality. When geographical
area–year interactions are included, natural disasters are no longer significant for
either the crude birth rate or total fertility, but both the number and the intensity of
earthquakes have a significant negative effect on marital fertility. For non-marital
fertility, the number of earthquakes has a significant positive effect, which may
explain why the net effect of earthquakes on total fertility is insignificant, and the
16 The exception is that when only 10 previous years are considered for both disasters and economic
volatility (model 7), disasters no longer have a significant effect.
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number of volcano eruptions has a significant negative effect, but, because the
p-value on the joint test of the number of natural disasters is higher and because
neither earthquake intensity nor volcano magnitude has a significant effect, the
effects of natural disasters on non-marital fertility are weaker than they are on
marital fertility.
Taken together, the results using the regional data for Italy provide strong
evidence that fertility behavior is negatively associated with environmental shocks
and short-run economic volatility. The channel through which this occurs appears to
be marital fertility: married couples who experienced natural disasters and volatile
wages over the previous two decades will tend to have fewer children.
As seen in the results of the spatial lag model in Table 5, natural disasters
continue to have a significant negative association with the crude birth rate even
when spatial spillovers are taken into account. When region fixed effects are used,
economic volatility is negatively associated with the crude birth rate as well. Thus,
Table 4 The effects of natural disasters on fertility using geographical area–year interactions: Italy,
1820–1962
Dependent variable





































Geographical area effects Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
year effects Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Geographical area—year
effects
Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
p-value (Prob [ F) [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Adj. R squared 0.90 0.90 0.90 0.90 0.86 0.86 0.64 0.63
# Observations 212 212 184 184 184 184 184 184
Joint test of all natural
disaster variables (p-
value)
[0.344] [0.319] [0.368] [0.410] [0.012] [0.015] [0.041] [0.183]
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. Fertility indices are multiplied by 100. Coefficients that are
statistically significant at a 5% level are in bold. Prob [ F is the p-value from F-tests on all the coef-
ficients (excluding the constant). For all specification tests, results for which the null hypothesis should be
rejected at a 5% level are in bold. Each dependent variable spans 3 years per observation. Consequently,
the natural disaster variables, which represent the sum of either the number or intensity of natural
disasters over the last 20 years, are averaged over 3 years. All variables spanning multiple years are
centered on year
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the negative association of natural disasters and economic volatility with fertility is
robust to spatial effects.
The story is somewhat different for Japan, as seen in Table 6. When 20 previous
years of natural disasters are considered, the number of tsunamis has a significant
negative association with the crude birth rate. In the base case (model 1), an
additional tsunami in the previous 20 years decreases the crude birth rate by 246
births per 100,000 people. Relative to the mean crude birth rate for Japan over this
time period (1727–1935) of 29.07 per 1000, this is a 8.46% decrease. Tsunamis no
longer have a significant effect when only 10 previous years of natural disasters is
used instead of 20. Tsunami magnitude has no significant effect on fertility. Neither
volcano eruptions or earthquakes have a significant effect on fertility in any of the
models. Unlike for Italy, economic volatility does not have any effect in any of the
models.
Table 7 reports the results when region–year interactions are included to control
for all the factors other than natural disasters that vary by locality and time,
including local economic shocks. When geographical area–year interactions are
included, tsunamis continue to have a negative effect on fertility, this time both in
number and magnitude. Unlike before, earthquakes have a significant positive effect
on fertility, both in number and magnitude. As before, the crude death rate has no
significant effect.
The results that natural disasters still have a significant effect on fertility even
after controlling for local time-varying effects such as local mortality and local
wages suggests that natural disasters in of themselves affect fertility, even when
Table 5 The effects of natural disasters on crude birth rates using a spatial lag model: Italy, 1880–1962
Dependent variable is cbr (per 1000)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
# Earthquakes 20.33 (0.10) 20.21 (0.05)
# Volcano eruptions 0.31 (0.49) 20.62 (0.60)
Earthquake intensity 20.04 (0.01) 20.02 (0.00)
Volcano magnitude 0.10 (0.16) 20.14 (0.18)
Crude death rate 0.85 (0.25) 20.31 (0.14) 0.73 (0.24) 20.32 (0.14)
Real wage 20.04 (0.05) 0.03 (0.02) 0.05 (0.05) 0.03 (0.02)
Variance in real wage/1000 23.68 (1.02) 22.75 (0.52) 24.13 (0.98) 22.76 (0.51)
year 0.19 (0.13) 20.26 (0.07) 0.19 (0.12) 0.26 (0.07)
Region effects N Y N Y
q 0.01 (0.01) 0.04 (0.02) 0.01 (0.01) 0.04 (0.02)
# Observations 106 106 106 106
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. Coefficients that are statistically significant at a 5% level are in
bold. The dependent variable spans 3 years per observation. Consequently, the natural disaster variables,
which represent the sum of either the number or intensity of natural disasters over the last 20 years, are
averaged over 3 years. Similarly, the real wage and the variance of the wage (which is the variance in the
detrended wage over the past 20 years, divided by 1000) are averaged over 3 years as well. Geographical
area-level crude death rates span 4–5 years per observation. All variables spanning multiple years are
centered on year
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controlling for its effect on the wage and on mortality. Natural disasters do not
simply operate through disaster-induced reductions in income or through disaster-
induced mortality. In order to further investigate whether natural disasters operate
through the mortality channel alone, I aggregated the crude death rates over the
previous 20 years and used that variable instead of the number of natural disasters
over the previous 20 years. The results are presented in Table 8. The coefficient on
the crude death rate over the previous 20 years is not significant for either Italy or
Japan. As with the previous results with the natural disaster regressions, the
coefficient on the variance of the wage over the previous 20 years is significant and
negative for Italy. The insignificant coefficients on the crude death rate over the
previous 20 years may be because the crude death rate is a noisy measure of the
number of deaths due to disasters, and because individual fertility may respond to
the other disruptions resulting from the natural disaster than death alone. Thus,
natural disasters have an effect on fertility that extends beyond its effect on
mortality. Mortality is not the only channel from natural disasters to fertility.
The results, therefore, show that natural disasters have a significant negative
association with fertility in Italy and a significant negative effect for tsunamis and
Table 7 The effects of natural disasters on crude birth rates using region–year interactions: Japan, 1671–
1965
Dependent variable is cbr (per 1000)
(1) (2)
# Earthquakes 4.64 (1.76)
# Tsunamis 212.17 (2.82)
# Volcano eruptions 20.38 (1.42)
Earthquake magnitude 0.86 (0.35)
Tsunami magnitude 22.14 (0.66)
Volcano magnitude 20.09 (0.36)
Crude death rate 0.24 (0.14) 0.24 (0.14)
Region effects Y Y
year effects Y Y
Region—year effects Y Y
p-value (prob [ F) [0.000] [0.000]
Adj. R squared 0.89 0.89
# Observations 165 165
Joint test of all natural disaster variables (p-value) [0.004] [0.051]
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. Coefficients that are statistically significant at a 5% level are in
bold. Prob [ F is the p-value from F-tests on all the coefficients (excluding the constant). For all
specification tests, results for which the null hypothesis should be rejected at a 5% level are in bold. Crude
birth rates span 1–41 years per observation, with an average span of approximately 10 years. Conse-
quently, the natural disaster variables, which represent the sum of either the number or intensity of natural
disasters over the last 20 years, are averaged over 10 years. Crude death rates span the same number of
years as the crude birth rate for each observation. All variables spanning multiple years are centered on
year
Popul Environ (2010) 31:255–281 275
123
positive effect for earthquakes in Japan. Short-run economic volatility has negative
associations with fertility in Italy, but not in Japan. Thus, at least in Italy, short-run
instability, particularly that arising from the natural environment, is associated with
lower investment in the population size of future generations.
Concluding remarks
The research in this article presents a detailed investigation of the effects of
environmental and economic instability on fertility and its components in both Italy
and Japan. For identification, regional data are used to exploit the natural variation
within each of these two countries.
Three results deserve special mention. First, environmental shocks have a
significant association with fertility behavior in both countries, even after
controlling for year, the death rate, the wage, short-run economic volatility, and
steady-state risk. The sign of the association varies by country and disaster type. In
Italy, earthquakes had a robust negative association with fertility, particularly
marital fertility. In Japan, tsunamis had a robust negative association with fertility,
while earthquakes had a significant positive association with fertility in some
specifications.
Table 8 The effects of mortality on crude birth rates in Italy (1880–1962) and Japan (1737–1935)
Dependent variable is cbr (per 1000)
Country Italy Japan
# Previous years of economic volatility 20 20
(1) (2)
Crude death rate over previous 20 years 20.04 (0.03) 0.00 (0.01)
Contemporaneous crude death rate 20.35 (0.17) 20.02 (0.10)
Real wage 0.05 (0.03) 0.04 (0.17)
Variance in real wage over previous 20 years/1000 21.69 (0.40) 64.12 (43.94)
Year 20.38 (0.07) -0.03 (0.04)
Region or place effects Y Y
p-value (prob [ F) [0.000] [0.000]
Adj. R squared 0.91 0.49
# Observations 120 146
Joint test of all economic variables (p-value) [0.000] [0.296]
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. Coefficients that are statistically significant at a 5% level are in
bold. Prob [ F is the p-value from F-tests on all the coefficients (including year and the region dummies,
but excluding the constant). For all specification tests, results for which the null hypothesis should be
rejected at a 5% level are in bold. The crude birth rate variable spans 3 years per observation for Italy and
1–41 years with an average span of approximately 10 years for Japan. Consequently, the real wage and
the variance of the wage (which is the variance in the detrended wage over the past 20 years, divided by
1000) are averaged over 3 years for Italy and 10 years for Japan. For Italy, geographical area-level crude
death rates span 4–5 years per observation. For Japan, rude death rates span the same number of years as
the crude birth rate for each observation. All variables spanning multiple years are centered on year
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A second important result is that short-run economic volatility, as measured by
the variance of the detrended wage, has a significant negative association with
fertility in Italy. Taken together, the significant negative association between short-
run instability and fertility behavior in Italy suggest that, just as economic instability
decreases investment in physical and human capital, environmental shocks and
economic volatility are associated with a decrease in investment in the population
size of future generations.
These results have many important implications. First, the results have
implications for understanding differences in income and population growth both
within and between countries and both throughout the past and in the present.
Second, they have implications for policies regarding disaster insurance, foreign aid,
and the environment. Third, these results have important implications for the
development of models of behavior under uncertainty. Fourth, the results have
implications for the design of policies for risk-sharing. If natural disasters cause a
decrease in fertility because they make families reluctant to invest in having
children, then risk-sharing policies such as disaster insurance can help mitigate
these effects. Moreover, in countries such as Italy where economic volatility is
associated with a decline in fertility, policies such as foreign aid or prohibitions
against cutting wages that minimize the volatility can attenuate the impact on
fertility. These policies can be the subject of future research.
The third important result is that, just as there are differences in how fertility
rates in Italy and Japan respond to natural disasters, there are systematic differences
in how fertility rates in these two countries respond economic volatility. The
variance in the detrended wage has a negative association on the crude birth rate,
total fertility and marital fertility in Italy, but an insignificant effect on the crude
birth rate in Japan. One possible reason why the fertility choices of the Japanese
respond less to economic volatility than do those of the Italians is that there may be
some institutions in Japan, such as cultural norms, that already provide the Japanese
with insurance against economic volatility. Another possible reason is that, as seen
in the summary statistics in Table 1, the Japanese wage appears less volatile than
the Italian wage, and thus may be too stable to have much of an effect of fertility.
The different effects of natural disasters and economic volatility on Italy versus
Japan highlight the importance of country-specific factors such as social attitudes,
cultural values, network behavior, history, politics, and people’s fertility prefer-
ences. Contrary to Jones’ (1981) theory, differences in fertility between Italy and
Japan cannot be explained away by disaster proneness alone. These other factors
vary by country, and are likely to be different for other countries in Asia and Europe
as well.
The main results are, therefore, that natural disasters have a significant
association with fertility in both countries. In Italy, earthquakes had a robust
negative association with fertility, particularly marital fertility. In Japan, tsunamis
had a robust negative association with fertility while earthquakes had a significant
positive association with fertility in some specifications. Short-run economic
volatility has a significant negative association with fertility in Italy but no
association in Japan. These results should be of interest to economists, historians,
environmentalists, and policymakers alike.
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Table 9 Raw data for Italy, 1820–1962
Variable Source
Regional variables
Crude birth rate (per 1000) Livi-Bacci 1977, pp. 22–23 and 62
Total fertility index If Treadway 1980
Marital fertility index Ig Treadway 1980
Non-marital fertility index Ih Treadway 1980
Natural disaster variables
# Earthquakes Dunbar et al. 1999
Earthquake intensity (Modified Mercalli Intensity) Dunbar et al. 1999
# Volcano eruptions Whiteside 1999
Volcano magnitude (volcano explosivity index ? 1) Whiteside 1999
Geographical area-level variables
Crude death rate (per 1000) Del Panta 1979, p. 226
National variables
Real wage (1900 = 100) Williamson 1995
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